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Paul OrmerodAbstract
A data base developed from the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism’s (MIPT) Terrorism Knowledge
Base for the years 1998–2005 was provided to participants in the workshop. The distribution of fatalities in terrorist
attacks is, like many outcomes of human social and economic processes, heavily right-skewed. We propose an
agent based model to analyse this, and to enable generalisations to be made from the historical data set. The
model is inspired by modelling developments in cultural evolutionary theory. We argue that a more appropriate
‘null’ model of behaviour in the social sciences is on based upon the principle of copying, rather than the
economic assumption of rationality in the standard social science model.
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Asal and Rethemeyer [1] report an econometric analysis
of a data base developed from the Memorial Institute for
the Prevention of Terrorism’s (MIPT) Terrorism Know-
ledge Base. The dataset is complete for the years 1998–
2005. Of the 395 clearly identified terrorist organizations
operating throughout the world over this period, only 68
killed 10 or more people during that period. Indeed, only
28 killed more than 100 people. The econometric study
analyses the factors which can account for this dramatic
difference in organizational lethality.
They conclude that “(1) large organizations, (2) orga-
nizations that address supernatural audiences through
religious ideologies, (3) organizations with religious-
ethnonationalist ideologies— ideologies that define an
other and play to the supernatural, (4) organizations
that build and maintain extensive alliance connections
with peers, and (5) organizations that maintain control
over territory are the primary actors in this story.
Though much of the organizational and social move-
ments literature suggest that new organizations are less
effective and able, our data was unable to find evi-
dence that newness matters. Some widely held theories
about the correlates of lethality—including the beliefCorrespondence: pormerod@volterra.co.uk
Volterra Partners LLP, London, UK
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in any medium, provided the original work is pthat state sponsorship and “homebase” regime-type
would affect organizational lethality—could not be sub-
stantiated with our data. In fact, there is equivocal evi-
dence that state sponsorship tend to restrain killing by
client organizations. Size coupled with religious and
ethnonationalist ideology generates the capability
needed to pursue deadly ends”.
This paper considers a potential generalisation of the
econometric approach using the methodology of agent
based modelling (ABM). Section 2 briefly considers
methodological aspects of the issue, and section 3 dis-
cusses some principles of agent behaviour. Section 4 sets
out the model and section 5 discusses some illustrative
results.
Some methodological reflections
The Asal and Rethemeyer paper is detailed and thor-
ough, and takes proper account of the heavily right-
skewed nature of the dependent variable, the number of
people killed in each incident. The dependent variable
ranges from 0 to 3505 with a median of 0, a mean of
31.36 and a standard deviation of 202.04. Of the 395
organizations for which there are data, 240 of those
organizations perpetrated one or more incidents that
resulted in no fatalities.
However, econometric analysis of data, no matter how
sophisticated, essentially involves fitting a plane throughpen Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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regression technique is based upon the principle of max-
imum likelihood, the result can still be given this geo-
metric interpretation. Helbing [2] offers a more detailed
description of the potential restrictions of this approach,
but one of the essential problems can be summarised as
follows.
A restriction on the ability to generalise from econo-
metric results is that a small number of data points
may exercise a strong influence on the fit of the n-
dimensional plane. Consider, for example, the standard
linear regression model y ¼ Xβþ ε , where the vector
of estimated parameters is b ¼ XTXð Þ1XTy and the
fitted values are y ¼ Xb ¼ X XTXð Þ1XTy.
The hat matrix, H, maps the vector of fitted values to
the vector of observed values, and describes the influ-
ence each observed value has on each fitted value [3],
where H ¼ X XTXð Þ1XT . It is the orthogonal projection
onto the column space of the matrix of explanatory
factors, X.
This matrix can be used to identify observations which
have a large influence on the results of a regression. If
such observations exist, ideally we would like to have
more data from this part of the observation space. So if
we have a small number of observations in the tail of
the distributions of both an explanatory and the
dependent variable and these are correlated, such obser-
vations will inevitably exercise a strong influence on the
results.
Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, large terrorist
organisations, and particularly those which maintain and
build extensive alliances, are identified in econometric
analysis as being two of the key factors which are linked
to effective attacks leading to high levels of fatality.
However, more generally, we are interested not so
much in projecting the single path of history which we
actually observe into the future, but in considering the
evolutionary potential of the groups. The policy message
from the econometrics is to focus on large, well con-
nected groups in the prevention of attacks. But, for ex-
ample, what is the potential for small, less connected
groups to acquire the ability to develop the capacity to
carry out highly effective attacks?
Agent based modelling is a way of trying to examine
the evolutionary potential of any given system. Helbing
and Barietti [4], for example, state that ‘computer simu-
lation can be seen as experimental technique for hypoth-
esis testing and scenario analysis’. They go on to argue
that ‘agent-based simulations are suited for detailed hy-
pothesis-testing, i.e. for the study of the consequences of
ex-ante hypotheses regarding the interactions of agents.
One could say that they can serve as a sort of magnify-
ing glass or telescope (“socioscope”), which may be used
to understand our reality better. . . by modeling therelationships on the level of individuals in a rule-based
way, agent-based simulations allow one to produce char-
acteristic features of the system as emergent phenomena
without having to make a priori assumptions regarding
the aggregate (“macroscopic”) system properties’.
Approaches to agent behaviour
The standard socio-economic science model, SSSM [5],
postulates a high level of cognitive ability on the part of
agents. Agents are assumed to be able to gather all rele-
vant information, and to process it in such a way as to
arrive at an optimal decision, given their (fixed) tastes
and preferences. Even with the relaxation of the assump-
tion of complete information [6], agents are still pre-
sumed to have formidable cognitive powers. This, the
core model of economics, has a certain amount of ex-
planatory power, though as [5] goes on to state; ‘Within
economics there is essentially only one model to be
adapted to every application: optimization subject to
constraints due to resource limitations, institutional
rules and/or the behavior of others, as in Cournot-Nash
equilibria. The economic literature is not the best place
to find new inspiration beyond these traditional tech-
nical methods of modeling’.
Perhaps the most important challenge to this approach
comes when decisions do not depend not on omniscient
cost-benefit analysis of isolated agents with fixed tastes
and preferences, but when the decision of any given
agent depends in part directly on what other actors are
doing. In such situations, which are probably the norm
rather than the exception in social settings, not only do
choices involve many options for which costs and bene-
fits would be impossible to calculate (e.g., what friends
to keep, what job to pursue, what game to play, etc.), but
the preferences of agents themselves evolve over time in
the light of what others do.
Complex choices can be fundamentally different from
simple two-choice scenarios, such that the problem
becomes very difficult to predict, as has been demon-
strated in ecological [7] and human settings [8]. Such
scenarios are where so-called zero-intelligence models
[9] do better at understanding emergent patterns in col-
lective behaviour. However, despite their empirical suc-
cess e.g. [10-12], they have met with resistance amongst
social scientists.
The zero intelligence model is based upon the particle
model of physics. Indeed, one of the fastest-rising key-
words in the physics literature is ‘social’. Literally thou-
sands of papers in physics are devoted to modeling
social systems, and indeed regular sections of leading
journals such as Physica A and Physical Review E are
devoted to this topic. The analogy between people and
particles has been so consistent that a recent popular re-
view was appropriately titled The Social Atom [11].
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modeling collective interactions in social systems, from
Internet communities to pedestrian and vehicular traffic,
economic markets and even prehistoric human migra-
tions e.g. [13-15].
The idea that there are serious limits to human cogni-
tive powers in complex systems is one which has strong
empirical support. Kahneman, for example [16] argues
that ‘humans reason poorly and act intuitively’. Deci-
sions may often be taken in circumstances in which the
assumption that individuals have no knowledge of the
situation is a better approximation to reality than is
the assumption that they possess complete information
and have the capacity to process this information to
make optimal decisions.
An illustration of the limits to human awareness and
social calculation is the well known Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, invented by Drescher and Flood in 1950. The op-
timal strategy or “Nash equilibrium” for the one period
game was discovered very quickly. However, as docu-
mented in detail in [17]. Flood recruited distinguished
RAND analysts John Williams and Armen Alchian, a
mathematician and economist respectively, to play 100
repetitions of the game. The Nash equilibrium strategy
ought to have been played by completely rational indivi-
duals 100 times. It might, of course, have taken a few
plays for these high-powered academics to learn the
strategy. But Alchian chose co-operation rather than the
Nash strategy of defection 68 times, and Williams no
fewer than 78 times. Their recorded comments are fas-
cinating in themselves. Williams, the mathematician,
began by expecting both players to co-operate, whereas
Alchian the economist expected defection, but as the
game progressed, co-operation became the dominant
choice of both players.
Even now, after almost 60 years of analysis and literally
thousands of scientific papers on the subject, when
sufficient uncertainty is introduced into the game, the
optimal strategy remains unknown. Certainly, some
strategies do better than most in many circumstances,
but no one has yet discovered the optimal strategy
even for a game that is as simple to describe as the
Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Assumptions of optimality and rationality can be cer-
tainly be useful when payoffs are predictable from one
event to the next – hunting and gathering in a consist-
ent environment, for example, or even modern situa-
tions where the complexity of choices is low [18]. But
more generally, the zero intelligence model may be more
useful as the ‘null’.
However, as is argued in [19], human agents are fun-
damentally different from particles in physics in that,
however imperfectly, they can act with purpose and in-
tent. So the basic null model of zero intelligence needsto be modified to incorporate some aspect of this
functionality [20].
Simon in his seminal paper on behavioural economics
[21] argued that the fundamental issue which all sentient
beings have to take into account when taking decisions
is to reduce the massive dimensionality of the choice set
which they face: ‘Broadly stated, the task is to replace
the global rationality of economic man with a kind of ra-
tional behavior that is compatible with the access to in-
formation, and the computational capacities that are
actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the
kinds of environments in which such organisms exist’.
An important way of coping with an evolving, complex
environment is to follow a strategy of copying, or social
learning as it is described in cultural evolution. In social
and economic systems, decision makers often pay atten-
tion to each other either because they have limited infor-
mation about the problem itself or limited ability to
process even the information that is available [22].
A striking example of the power of simple copying
strategies in an evolving environment is provided by the
computer tournament described by [23]). As the abstract
states: ‘Social learning (learning through observation or
interaction with other individuals) is widespread in na-
ture and is central to the remarkable success of human-
ity, yet it remains unclear why copying is profitable and
how to copy most effectively. To address these ques-
tions, we organized a computer tournament in which
entrants submitted strategies specifying how to use so-
cial learning and its asocial alternative (for example,
trial-and-error learning) to acquire adaptive behavior in
a complex environment. Most current theory predicts
the emergence of mixed strategies that rely on some
combination of the two types of learning. In the tourna-
ment, however, strategies that relied heavily on social
learning were found to be remarkably successful, even
when asocial information was no more costly than social
information. Social learning proved advantageous be-
cause individuals frequently demonstrated the highest-
payoff behavior in their repertoire, inadvertently filtering
information for copiers. The winning strategy relied
nearly exclusively on social learning and weighted infor-
mation according to the time since acquisition’.
In other words, in a complex environment in which the
pay-off to various strategies was, by design, constantly
evolving, simple copying proved a very effective strategy.
Copying, of course, is the essence of the principle of pre-
ferential attachment, initially formulated in a general way
by Simon [24] and rediscovered by Barabasi and Albert
[25]. In its more recent incarnation, the model has been
hugely influential because it resulted in a power law (or at
least long-tailed) degree distribution (connections per net-
work node) – a kind of distribution so intriguing to many
that the editor of Wired magazine wrote an entire book,
Figure 1 Model overview.
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economies [26].
However, a key drawback of the approach is that it is
ultimately static. The rankings in the distribution, in
other words, gradually become fixed, and attempts to
modify the basic model are rather artificial [27]. Turn-
over in rankings is not just a feature of modern markets
of popular culture, but operates on the time scale
required for cities to evolve [28].
Preferential attachment is a special case of a model
developed in cultural evolutionary theory e. g, [29,30], in
which it remains the basic principle of decision making,
but an agent is also able (with a small probability) to
make an innovative choice. The model is developed from
the concept of genetic evolution, which is based on the
principles of copying and mutation (innovation).
In its most recent and most general formulation [31]
the model of social learning in cultural evolution is, with
just two parameters, capable of replicating any right
skewed distribution and of accounting for the turnover
which is observed in relative standings in any evolution-
ary environment. One parameter describes the relative
frequencies with which preferential attachment (copying)
and innovation are used to make decisions, and the
other describes the span of historical time used to ob-
serve the decisions which other agents have made.
Clearly, this latter is different for a firm choosing its lo-
cation to a teenager choosing which video to download
from YouTube.
The model
In order to try to generalise from the data set used by
Asal and Rethemeyer, we retain copying as one of the
basic principles used by terrorist organisations. They can
observe and copy, exactly as in the evolutionary learning
computer tournament, tactics and strategies used by
other organisations. In a situation in which the environ-
ment in which they operate evolves, the pay off (i.e.
number of fatalities inflicted) may of course differ from
previously enacted versions of the same tactic. But copy-
ing is one of the building blocks of the model.
We augment the model with further behavioural prin-
ciples which seem appropriate in this context. By its very
nature, the terrorist world is clandestine, and organisa-
tions will differ in their propensity to share information
about tactical capabilities with other such organisations.
In addition, organisations will differ in their willingness
or ability to absorb and execute a tactic they have not
previously used, even if it is explained to them by an-
other organisation.
We consider these factors in the context of the ability
of the organisations to acquire the capacity to carry out
an innovation, or tactical mutation, developed by a ter-
rorist group. An overview of the model is shown inFigure 1, which is similar to the model developed to ac-
count for the diffusion of technological innovations across
companies in four industries in the Greater Manchester re-
gion of the UK [32]: The model takes an initial mutation to
be exogenous and it is taken up by one agent/organisation
at the outset. The characteristics of the agents are governed
by their willingness to innovate, their desire to keep
innovation to themselves, and their willingness to commu-
nicate with others. The innovating agent will be connected
to other agents via the network structure, and at the next
step of the model the innovation will be passed on accord-
ing to the extent agents discover the mutation and their
own willingness to take it up. At further steps of the model
further agents may be able to discover and take up the mu-
tation, until eventually no further take up occurs.
We define two different methods by which tactical
mutations may be passed on via the network linkages.
The first is a direct relationship between two partners,
while the second is a group relationship.
First, an organisation with an innovation will provide
it to another only if its level of secrecy, or the propensity
of a group to try to retain the benefits of its innovations,
is less than the absorptive capacity, or the degree to
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able it to identify and adopt new innovations, of the
organisations it is linked with. This method of adopting
an mutation represents a mutual relationship or ex-
change between terrorist organisations and implies a de-
gree of trust or collaboration.
The second method for spreading a mutation is based
on the principle of copying. Here if a group looks at the
spectrum of organisations to which it is linked and finds
that the proportion that have adopted an innovation is
higher than their own personal threshold, they will
mimic their behaviour and adopt the mutation. In some
circumstances this threshold may be very high and only
when all or nearly all of the other groups an organisation
has relationships with have taken up an innovation will
they be persuaded to do the same. For other organisa-
tions relatively few outfits may have to have the same
innovation before they adopt it. This mechanism repre-
sents a copying behaviour. This may occur even when a
terrorist group may not fully understand the reasons and
benefits of a mutation but relies on observing that others
have adopted it. This behaviour is more likely to be a re-
sponse to competitor behaviour.
Figure 2 plots the distribution of the numbers of con-
nections between organisations in the data set.
In each separate solution of the model, a network is
generated which has the same distribution as that of the
data. More precisely, the null hypothesis that the model
network has the same degree distribution as the data is
not rejected on a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at a p-value
<0.01, far below the conventional level of statistical sig-
nificance. In other words, we can regard the model net-
works as being identical in degree distribution to the
actual data.
In this illustrative application of the model:
 Each agent is allocated at random a willingness to
seek and adopt an innovation/mutation, αi, drawn



















Figure 2 Degree distribution of connections between terrorist
organisations. Each agent is allocated at random a willingness to
share an innovation, σj, drawn from a uniform on
[0,1].
 An agent adopts the innovation of another if αi > σj.
 Each agent has a threshold for imitating the
innovations of its neighbours, τi drawn from
uniform on [0.5,1].
This latter rule is the principle of binary choice (adopt
or not adopt) with externalities [21,33].
The model proceeds in a series of steps, in each of
which the following procedure is operated. First, all
agents not in possession of the mutation who are not
connected to any other organisation which does have
the innovation are identified. These agents play no fur-
ther part in this particular step of the model. Of course,
in subsequent steps, agents to which they are connected
may by then have acquired the mutation. So whilst they
may not acquire it in this period, they are not precluded
from so doing in future steps within the same solution
of the model.
If the absorptive capacity, αi of the agent without the
innovation is greater than the willingness to share (or se-
crecy), σj, of the agent with the innovation, the agent is
assumed to adopt the innovation. If not, the copying rule
is then invoked, and the agent adopts it if its threshold
is lower than the proportion of agents to which it is con-
nected which has the innovation.
Any particular solution of the model ends when no
agent adopts the mutation in a given step of the model.
We measure and record the proportion of agents which
have adopted the innovation.
This process is the basic building block of the illustra-
tive approach. We can readily imagine, however, that
certain capabilities are inherently harder to acquire than
others. Shooting a civilian (e.g. a member of the IRA
shooting a Protestant at random in Northern Ireland)
requires much lower levels of skill and expertise than a
co-ordinated bombing. We illustrate the effects of intro-
ducing this into the model in the following heuristic
way.
We populate the model with 1000 agents and solve it
1000 times. At the end of each solution, the organisa-
tions which have acquired the innovation are deemed
capable of carrying out a relatively low level attack,
which we describe as Level 1 capability. The model is
reinitialised, a new agent is selected at random to ac-
quire an innovation, and the process is repeated. At the
end of this, more agents will have acquired Level cap-
ability. And those which acquired it in the first solution
and in addition acquire it in this new one are deemed to
have acquired Level 2 capability. In other words, they
have acquired sufficient technical skill to mount more





































Figure 3 Proportion of terrorist organisations for each value of degree of connections which acquire the capability to carry out Level 1
attacks, average across 1,000 solutions.
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which acquire the innovation on all three occasions are
deemed capable of Level 3 attacks.
Discussion and results
Some properties of the model are illustrated in the three
graphs below. These are the results averaged across
1,000 separate solutions of the model, and show the total
percentage of organisations with a given degree (num-
ber) of links which acquire the capabilities to acquire the
ability to carry out Levels 1, 2 and 3-type attacks.
First, Figure 3 shows the results for Level 1
capabilities.
Quite rapidly, the connection between the acquisition
of this level of capability and the degree of an organisa-
tion’s links with other terrorist groups falls away. Only a
very small percentage of groups with a very low number




































Figure 4 Proportion of terrorist organisations for each value of degre
attacks, average across 1,000 solutions.capability. But the proportion of organisations which ac-
quire it and which have, say, just 6 links is not very dif-
ferent from the proportion of those with 26 links which
acquire. Only for those with a very high number of con-
nections does the proportion rise.
Figures 4 and 5 show the results for the proportions
which acquire Levels 2 and 3 capabilities.
The precise topology of the network and the para-
meters allocated to each agent differ across each of the
1,000 solutions of the model, but the same network and
parameter values are retained within each solution for
each of the steps of acquisition capability. So, for ex-
ample, the structure may be such that an agent is con-
nected to another which is very likely to acquire the
mutation, and the parameters are such (in particular the
absorption and secrecy parameters) that it, too, is there-
fore likely to acquire it. So the proportion of agents of
any given degree acquiring Level 3 capability is not17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33
egree





































Figure 5 Proportion of terrorist organisations for each value of degree of connections which acquire the capability to carry out Level 3
attacks, average across 1,000 solutions.
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those acquiring Level 1, but is much higher.
These results are illustrative of a principle of how to
try to generalize from the data set. Indeed, we see that
the proportion of organizations with only weak connec-
tions to others which acquire level 3 capabilities is, apart
from those with virtually none, non-trivial. So although
in the one actual history we are able to observe, organi-
zations with low levels of connections tended not to
carry out attacks involving high levels of fatalities, this
does not mean that in future they will be unable to ac-
quire such characteristics.
We are not claiming that this is a definite model
with which to inform future policy, though it does
offer some potential guidelines. Rather, it illustrates
how an agent based model constructed on evolutionary
principles in a complex environment can be used to
extract more information from a data set than is pos-
sible using conventional analytical methods such as
econometrics. One potential extensions is to endogen-
ise the network, such that agents have incentives to
develop new links, but also introducing extinctions of
agents, which may be enhanced (made easier for the
authorities) as the number of connections of an
organization increase ([34] offers a general model of
extinctions in an evolving network). Another is to
endogenise the parameters, so that agent behavior
becomes reinforced both by reference to their own
previous decisions and by reference to the properties
of their neighbours.Competing interests
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